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This survey covers recent literature on lobbying, with particular focus on corporate 
lobbying. Three main research traditions --- contestsfor policy rent, persuasion 
games, and multiple means models --- are analyzed in detail. Various strategic 
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thereview investigates into three particular issues in the lobbying literature: (i) 
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lobbying and contributions,and (iii) the role of intermediation in lobbying. Recent 
evidence from corporate lobbying is presented. 
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Measured by observable spending, lobbying represents the single most important channel
of corporate political inuence (Ansolabehere et al. 2003; Bennedsen and Feldman 2002; de
Figueiredo and Cameron 2008). By meeting with the policy makers, hiring lawyers and policy
experts, submitting briefs, conveying research results and technical information, engaging in
media advertising and PR campaigns, and participating in protests, rms build and maintain
inuence over policies. Their aim is to seek rents through favorable regulations, tax treatment,
public procurements, and aid, or to shelter from rent-extraction by means of arbitrary tax
demands.
This study reviews the latest developments in the theory on lobbying, and recent evidence
gathered specically for corporate lobbying. Proliferation of the contest literature, disclosure
games, strategic information transmission and communication has changed the landscape of
the lobbying modeling in the last decade. Also, the choice from a set of instruments has only
recently been addressed in multiple-means models. To our best knowledge, progress in this
area since reviews by Grossman and Helpman (2001) and Winden (2003) has not yet been
put into a single treatment.
We identify three distinctly dierent modeling traditions: contests for policy rent, strate-
gic information transmission, and multiple means models. To clarify their dierences, the
survey is structured such that it investigates separately all modeling features that make the
traditions dierent. In the rst step, we reect the developments of the contest literature of
the last decade, especially the attempts to build explicit informational foundations for the
contest for policy rent. Secondly, we show how lobbying is modeled by persuasion games with
informational search. Third, we build a unied model following Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011) and illustrate how multiple instruments for political inuence can be combined within
a single setting.
The survey reects also advances on the empirical front. Lobbying by rms has been
selected as the major part of observable lobbying outlays, where benets can be identied
and industries can be classied. Also, growing corporate lobbying raises a growing public
concern (The Economist, 2011). In the last decade, a group of articles exploited survey rm-
level data on political inuence from the World Bank Enterprise Survey and World Economic
Forum. In the US, the Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995 revealed the exact lobbying outlays
in the United States and provides relatively clean data on the salaries of lobbyists and their
sta, and prices per reports and fees for expert consultants. All together, the studies shed
the light upon the size of the market, its asymmetries, cost-benet ratios of lobbying, and the
key role of intermediation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 very briey presents and classies the latest
theories of lobbying. Section 3 builds a general model and reviews the key modeling ingredi-
ents in details and sheds light on the key mechanisms of lobbying models. Section 4 exploits
1state-of-the-art knowledge to address the selected questions: When does lobbying pay o?
Are lobbying and direct contributions to policy-makers substitutes or complements? What is
the eect of regulations on competitive lobbying? What explains the presence of lobbying in-
termediaries? For each particular question, both theory and evidence is summarized. Section
5 concludes.
2 Theory
The literature on the means of corporate political inuence spans across separate elds of
economic theory, political economy, and political science. Luckily, in spite of a great variety of
contributions, the main ideas can be presented and explained in relative simple and tractable
static settings accessible even to non-specialists.
To begin with, we classify the literature into three main families of models. In all what
follows, we shall use PM and L as abbreviations for a policy maker and lobby.
2.1 Policy rent
2.1.1 Contests
Inuence functions. The early political economy models allow policies to be inuenced
by lobbying eort by postulating an inuence function that directly maps eort into inuence
(e.g., Becker 1983; for a survey, see van Winden 2003). Axiomatic restrictions on the prop-
erties of the production of inuence allow to study the eects of competition, and changes
in the inuence technology. As a reduced-form approach, the functions bring about several
interesting and testable implications, but at the same time abstract from at least two key
problems, namely (i) modeling consistently policy-makers' motivations, and (ii) explaining
precisely the channels of inuence. Instead of developing and calibrating the inuence func-
tions, subsequent research thus has switched attention to building explicit microfoundations
of inuence, asking why policy makers respond to evidence, oers and threats, and how is
information shared between lobbyists and policy-makers in the process of exerting inuence.
Rent seeking. At the time when inuence functions were in retreat, the rent-seeking tradi-
tion associated mainly with Tullock (1980) ourished and now still remains a lively platform
for modeling political inuence of corporations and other interest groups.1 A rent-seeking
contest constitutes a special form of an inuence function; again, investments into political
inuence are irreversible, and there is no restriction on how the investments should be in-
terpreted and operationalized. The major dierence is that a rent-seeking contest is explicit
in how the inuence is bought (cost function) and how exactly inuence aects the policy
(through probability of winning a policy rent or gaining share of the policy rent).
1For a survey on outcomes and costs of rent-seeking contests, see Del Rosal (2011).
2Technically, rent-seeking contest is a mechanism that distributes a policy prize to the
contest winner(s). The prize can be interpreted as the right to set a certain policy. Valuation
of the prize may be player-specic. The costs of the eort are captured by a separable cost
function, and costs are irreversible up-front payments. The probabilities of winning a prize
(or shares of the prize) are given by a predetermined contest-success function (CSF). Two
functions are studied most frequently, Tullock's lottery and all-pay auction. Both are special
cases of a logit function, where Tullock lottery represents a case of imperfect discrimination
and under a common cost of eort is equivalent to a simple rae while the all-pay auction
represents a perfectly-discriminating contest.
One problem with any CSF is that it is empirically dicult to determine its shape. Hang
(2002) shows that an exclusion restriction may serve as a useful test: For a Tullock lottery,
excluded lobbyists must have lower valuation than included lobbyists. In contrast, for an
all-pay auction, excluded lobbyists are those with the higher valuation. Testing the shape is
complicated also by the necessity to control for other properties; for example, since the level
of outlays depends on the degree on players' asymmetry, a test for elasticity of eort that
uses aggregate spending requires a measure of asymmetry. Even more importantly, the test
must control for the possibility to commit to a compromising policy, because in the absence
of commitment, an increase in discrimination in most cases increases outlays (Epstein and
Nitzan 2004), whereas with commitments, total expenditures fall if discrimination increases
(M unster 2006).
Most importantly, like in any model assuming inuence, contests put the source of inu-
ence into a black box. The eort can represent a variety of channels: (i) a pure transfer to
the politicians in the form of campaign contributions or direct compensations, (ii) services
provided by an intermediary, for example access facilitation, or (iii) investments into search
for valuable evidence. Also, rent-seeking tradition considers lobbying to be a single activity
of exerting pressure, and this is at odds with a more rened approach that denes lobbying
only as search and communication of evidence.
To answer whether a contest captures also investments into search and communication
which is our preferred denition of lobbying, it is rst important to see if a CSF can be
explained by means of pure informational transmission. The agreement within the rent-
seeking camp is not complete. Epstein and Nitzan (2006b, p. 424) doubt that the contest
approach is useful for dealing with the role of asymmetric information in politics at all. In
contrast, persuasion contests and innovation races demonstrate that a competition in raising
knowledge may exhibit properties of a CSF.
Persuasion contests. Lagerl of (2007) presumes that a policy maker (PM) wants to award
a project to an ecient rm. Each rm knows its eciency, but nothing else. The lobbying
rms (L) search for evidence that would conrm their eciency, and search outcomes are
stochastic. Search is unobservable, so search cannot serve as a signal, and posteriors are
3conditional only upon the raised evidence. This model of persuasion contest is interesting as
it may produce non-linearity of total outlays in the number of rms. Skaperdas and Vaidya
(2011) model competition between lobbyists in gathering either deterministic or stochastic
evidence. Uncertainty is ensured by assumption on the PM's decision-making: The PM
follows the presented evidence in accordance with a likelihood-ratio function, which generates
the necessary stochastic element that ultimately leads to a CSF.
Innovation races. In the literature on research and labor tournaments, the problem is
not to convince PM of value of the proposed policy, but to generate the value as such.
Consider contestants who competitively search in order to gain extra competence, knowledge,
or skill that is valuable to PM. A simple version is in Baye and Hoppe (2003): Suppose two
players compete to be awarded a project, with government awarding the project to the better
proposal. Each player can search for designs. Then, if the design proposals are independent
draws from identical distributions, then the probability that a given player produces the best
design equals his share of the total number of designs. Glazer (2008) extends the setup by
allowing the government to bargain with several rms that present an equally good design.
In these settings, the government is time-consistent because it selects the best design to
maximize value, and it is randomness of search that delivers properties of the contest success
function, not any property of PM's decision-making.
Innovation races involve at least four fundamental dierences if compared to standard
contests for rent: (i) Investments are productive (used ex post in production), not unpro-
ductive (used only ex ante). (ii) The outcome of investment is private (excludable) input,
not a public good (such as public evidence). Thus, unlike for persuasion contest, the use of
the investment must be accompanied by a trade between the owner of the competence and
the PM. (iii) Payments to the PM are in the bargaining stage, not in the investment stage.
Thus, PM eectively seizes part of the rent by bargaining, not by contest. (iv) The role of
the contest is not to distribute the rent between the lobbyists and PM, but to create a rent.
To sum up, only a narrow class of activities that exert political inuence can be modeled as
both informational transmission and competitive contest.
2.1.2 Auctions and bargaining
Bargaining and auctions. Irreversibility (or all-pay) property of payments in contests is
motivated by observing that lobbying and campaign expenditures are simultaneously submit-
ted by competing parties prior to distribution of the prize, mainly to secure access to PM.
Still, one cannot neglect a mechanism where competing lobbyists pay only after they are as-
signed the policy rent. In that case (modeled either as binding bids or reversible/reimbursed
investments), it is interesting to see that the revenue-oriented PM may prefer to establish
reversibility. Consider two groups with an identical valuation v. In Tullock's contest with
irreversible payments, the government collects v
2. If there is a non-cooperative bargaining
4protocol where the government alternates take-or-leave oers between the groups, with dis-
count rate  2 (0;1), then, a subgame-perfect equilibrium gives the PM v
2  > v
2. In a
standard rst-price auction, equilibrium bids are even as large as v, and the expected revenue
is v > v
2 .
Epstein and Nitzan (2006b) study the design of rent allocation when a mixed-objective
PM may either organize contest or allocate the policy rent to a higher-value participant. This
issue becomes even more interesting when the PM also has agenda-setting power so it can
limit the set of policies that can be implemented by the winner of the contest. This constraint
imposed by the PM aects the valuations of the contestants, and represents another way how
the PM addresses the tradeo between setting a good policy and raising valuable payments.
Menu auctions. The idea of reversible investments (bids) can be approximated by a stan-
dard auction where the object to be auctioned is the right to set a policy. Alternatively, it
is not the right but the policy itself that is subject to auction. Given that an auction must
determine a policy from a set of mutually inconsistent policies, it must be organized as a menu
auction where bids are set contingent on policies and possibly other observables (Grossman
and Helpman 2001). A winning policy is determined by maximal total bids, and only bids
related to the winning policy are collected from the bidders. Thus, there is not a winner
who implements a favorable policy, but a winning policy supported by multiple contributors.
The menu-auction tends to represent a workhorse model of assignment of policy rent, even if
some properties of menu auctions have been subject to discussions, namely (i) the existence
of non-truthful equilibria, (ii) extremely large power of PM, implying that L should prefer
to focus on other means of inuence, including the selection of PM and incentives to avoid
participation; and (iii) need of L's commitment when collecting policy-contingent bids.
2.2 Strategic information transmission
Since lobbying is the process of conveying messages from L to PM, a natural question is
how precisely communication motivates PM to change the policy. Four groups of models
examine strategic communication. The decisive variables are whether the messages are costly
or costless, and whether they deliver veriable or non-veriable substantive evidence.
2.2.1 Persuasion
The rst in the class of strategic information transmission of non-veriable messages is cheap
talk, capturing all costless communication of biased L towards PM.2 The closer aligned are
the lobbyist's and policy-maker's preferences, the better cheap talk communication works.
Typically, the content of the message is the state of the world, where both lobbyist's and
2For a seminal chapter-long survey of the main developments, see Grossman and Helpman (2001, Ch. 4).
For an extension to sequential revelation of information, see Aumann and Hart (2003).
5policy-maker's optimal policy are correlated with the true state of the world, but the lobbyist's
policy is biased. A costless message on the state, taken in a literal way, may serve as a costless
signal if the lobbyist's bias is expected to be low. Although full revelation is generally not
achieved, the information improves. Typically, credibility of the cheap talk message further
improves in the presence of the opposition that applies counteractive lobbying, and if messages
are multidimensional.
The relevance of cheap talk modeling is mainly qualied by the existence of enormous
lobbying outlays and the size of the intermediary market, thus the role of cheap talk is seen
rather as a starting point for models with the cost of achieving and presenting messages.
When messages are veriable, message space is type-dependent and we speak of persua-
sion games (Milgrom 1981). Veriability appears to be particularly useful as a building
block of the search models. Veriability normally enhances credibility of the messages and
increases scope for full revelation. Under monotonicity assumptions (i.e., Receiver's best re-
sponse increasing in type and Sender's utility preferring higher action than Receiver), any
rationalizable equilibrium contains full revelation. (For a generalization, see Giovannoni and
Seidemann 2007.) In the presence of neologism-proofness (i.e., out-of-equilibrium messages
are taken literally), Ryan and Vaithianathan (2011) nevertheless show that veriability not
necessarily facilitates full revelation.
2.2.2 Signaling
A non-veriable message may deliver extra information to the PM also in the case it is
costly to give such a message. The (exogenous or endogenous) cost serves then as a signal
od the Sender's (L's) type. In a seminal exogenous-cost model, Potters and van Winden
(1992) show that signaling is parametrically-dependent: a small signaling cost does not convey
information, whereas the large cost deters from lobbying by means of signaling. Only an
intermediate cost separates those lobbyists who point to a relevant information from those
who exploit the opportunity to mislead. Signaling models also feature other problems typical
for information economics: (i) The presence of a costly message in the strategy set may
decrease expected lobbyist's payo, (ii) multiple equilibria and equilibria switches complicate
comparative statics, and (iii) pooling equilibria with zero extra information are present for
almost any parameters.
Austen-Smith and Banks (2000, 2002) combine costly messages (money burning) with
costless messages (cheap talk). The combination increases the scope for credible cheap-talk,
hence the existence of the instrument is complementary to the use of another instrument.
With endogenous cost and a single lobby, even full revelation is possible. Tovar (2011) made
a recent extension of endogenous cost setting with full revelation. Therein, L not only signals
at a selected level, but also oers a contribution schedule that is conditional upon all payo-
relevant variables, namely the state of nature and the policy.
62.2.3 Screening
When the access cost is imposed by the PM, we speak of screening. This concept of infor-
mation transmission is attractive because it explains why lobbies agree to paying substantial
amounts for being able to successfully communicate messages, even if the messages are not
veriable. This type of information transmission is attractive for two additional reasons: (i)
PM prefers to collect access payments instead of letting the signal to be produced by waste-
ful (money-burning) activities, and (ii) the access fee serves as a rationing device for a time
and attention-constrained politician who thereby balances `lobbying supply' and `lobbying
demand'.
For known bias, groups may separate such that moderate groups never pay but are always
listened to, whereas screening is applied only to extremists (Lohmann 1995). For unknown
bias, fee is paid either by close groups or extreme groups (Austin-Smith 1995; Lohmann 1993).
For a thorough treatment, see Grossman and Helpman (2001, Ch. 5.3). In Section 2.3.2, we
will show how screening has recently been used for veriable messages.
2.2.4 Search
Prior to conveying messages, lobbying needs to obtain evidence or signals that can be com-
municated. In all heretofore discussed models of strategic communication, the state of nature
or any signal was assumed to be the L's inherited private information. Once we abandon the
information asymmetry, a rm preferring certain policies needs extra supporting evidence and
her bias motivates L to seek extra evidence. In the end, information search complements the
persuasion games analyzed above (e.g., Lagerl of 2007, Henry 2009). Yet, search is not neces-
sarily just an extension of a persuasion game by a pre-play, where the persuasion interaction
constitutes a proper subgame. Specically, if search is unobservable or no-evidence message
can be reported, then persuasion is not a proper subgame, hence we cannot solve the search
game by inserting subgame equilibria from the persuasion games.
To sum up the section on strategic communication: The basic dierences between strategic
information transmission and the contest tradition are explicit motivation of PM, explicit
description of the inuence (through eect upon beliefs), a full description of the structure
of the information, and the presence of lesser commitments. The drawbacks of strategic
communication are multiplicity of equilibria, diculty to make robust predictions, and the
need to assume extreme sophistication on part of players to support certain equilibria.
2.3 Multiple means models
Although strategic information transmission illuminates communication aspects of lobbying,
it is silent on the role of other channels of inuence. Multiple-means models address this
problem by explicitly modeling the L's choice from several instruments for inuence. In
7this relatively heterogeneous group of papers, communication mechanisms are combined with
bargaining and auction schemes.
Timing is the key aspect to dierentiate between these two-instrument two-stage games.
For informational lobbying, evidence is rst gathered and presented, and then bribes follow
(show and pay). In pay for access, payments are made, and evidence is presented (pay and
show). Apriori, it is not clear which timing is more realistic. Notice that the dierence in
timing depends also on priors and the possibility to restrict access. With symmetric priors, L
cannot make an inuential message without an extra investment, and evidence-gathering is
the necessary rst step. Or, once access cannot be restricted, payments are likely to be made
after lobbying.
2.3.1 Lobby and pay
Informational lobbying presumes search and communication in the rst stage and payments in
the second stage. The second stage is either in the form of extra pressure (Dahm and Porteiro
2008a, 2008b) or in the form of non-cooperative bargaining (Bennedsen and Feldman 2006).
In the former case, the idea is that PM's posteriors can be modied by buying extra inuence.
In the latter case, the idea is that if there is a surplus between L and PM associated with a
policy change even after strategic information transmission, this surplus can be cashed in by
compensating payments. These two dierent approaches predict dierent relations between
the instruments. A third possibility is lobbying as signaling in the rst stage and payments
as menu-contributions in the second stage (Tovar 2011). Precisely, menus of contributions
are oered rst, then signals are produced and nally payments are made. This represents a
unique combination of endogenous-cost signaling and common agency in a single framework.
These models dier in how a surplus of a policy change is redistributed between PM and L
in the contribution subgame. In bilateral bargaining, an explicit non-cooperative bargaining
model derives how L compensates PM for a policy change. Another option is to directly
set either lobby's or policy-maker's WTP as a measure of compensations. For example,
Bennedsen and Feldman (2006) apply policy-maker's WTP for single-group lobbying, and
lobby's WTP for multiple-group lobbying (menu auction). Their idea is that a single lobby
has a strong bargaining power to capture full surplus, whereas competitive lobbying leads to
truthful contributions, where it is the PM who captures the entire surplus. In such a case,
comparison of single-group and multiple-group lobbying thus must account for the fact that
the bargaining strength of a corporation vis-a-vis politicians is not invariant to the number
of players. Moreover, even within menu auctions with multiple groups, truthful contributions
are not necessary the outcome; a winning lobby may set a best-response bid that makes PM
exactly indierent but the loser does not participate (see Felgenhauer 2010). Such a bid
makes the winning lobby capture full surplus from the policy change.
For several lobbies, each with a dierent optimal policy, bargaining between PM and
lobbies needs to be structured. The structure is determined either as contest (where ndings
8from Section 2.1.1 apply), auction (without or with policy commitments; see Epstein, Nitzan
2004), menu-auction (with or without PM's private information; see Felgenhauer 2010), or
as multilateral bargaining (e.g., with a sequence of alternate take-or-leave oers; see Glazer
2008).
2.3.2 Pay and lobby
Alternatively, contributions in the rst stage have to be paid to allow lobbying in the second
stage (`pay-to-play' politics). This logic conforms with intuition that campaign contributions
and some types of lobbying expenditures serve only as tickets for access to PM. The timing
eectively belongs into the class of screening models reviewed above. Yet, once the second
stage involves presenting veriable information, it begins to play a strategic role, and the
model is better seen as a special case in the class of two-stage models with payments and
veriable communication.
Two papers on pay-to-play politics with veriable information exist to date. In Austen-
Smith (1998), all lobbies that pay ticket are allowed to meet the PM. In Cotton (2009), a
single ticket is auctioned in an all-pay auction of two interest groups. Each group possesses
a private, jointly independent piece of evidence. Payments in this auction reveal both pieces
of evidence, hence ex post verication by the PM serves only to conrm the posteriors.
An all-pay auction of access appears to be an extremely attractive mechanism for the PM,
relative to other means including auctions of policy rent and contests for policy rent. Cotton
(2009) shows that selling access by means of all-pay auction is preferred to selling policy rent
by means of all-pay auction, unless his PM's valuation of the policy is signicantly lower than
the lobbies' valuations. One observes that screening combined with the persuasion subgame
is attractive both (i) relative to other means of information transmission (by securing full
revelation and raising more funds) and (ii) relative to other means of raising funds (by getting
a better policy).
3 Essentials
To understand more how lobbying inuences policy makers, it is essential to review ingredients
of the leading models. A detailed knowledge of the main building blocks gives us a chance to
check relevance of the models and also its qualitative predictions. We build the comparisons
on the grounds of a general setting by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) that captures a large
class of persuasion mechanisms, including signaling, cheap talk, veriable evidence, honest
mechanisms, and communication with lying costs.
93.1 States and policies
For states of the world in a nite state space  2 , let () denote the set of all probability
distributions on . A prior is 0 2 (). Policies d 2 D are from a compact policy space D.
L (Sender) has a utility function u(d;) and PM (Receiver) has a utility function v(d;). We
denote the PM's optimal set of policies for her belief  as d().
A frequently presented special case is for two states of the world (low and high),  =
fl;hg. Probability of high state is denoted  = Pr(h) 2 [0;1]. The prior probability is
0 2 [0;1]. Consider three policies, D = fdl;d0;dhg. For each player, expected payo of
any policy d 2 D is a linear combination of the payos in each state , hence is linear in .
For convenience, L's preferences over policies are invariant to states, such that 0 = u(dl) 
u(d0) < u(dh) = 1. For PM, a policy dl is optimal for PM if  = l, and a policy dh is optimal
if  = h, i.e., d(0) = dl and d(1) = dh. In addition, d(0) = d0, hence d0 is called default
policy.
Each persuasion/lobbying/communication mechanism induces a Bayes-plausible lottery
(distribution) over the PM's posteriors. Let () be any distribution of posteriors on ().
Then, for () to be induced by a persuasion mechanism in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the
expected posterior probability of each state equals its prior probability,
R
 d() = 0 (Bayes
plausibility). In our special case, if the lobbying mechanism leads to exactly m posteriors i,
i = 1;:::;m, then the distribution writes  = (p1;:::;pm), and Bayes-plausibility requires
E() =
P
i pii = 0.
We will specify the persuasion mechanism in the subsequent section. Now let us specify
the values of the persuasion mechanism for the players. First, suppose some selection criterion
ensures that optimal policy d() = argmaxD
R
v(d;)d() is a singleton for all posteriors
induced by the mechanism. Notice that the PM's indirect utility in her posterior  is con-




L's value (indirect utility) at a PM's posterior  is U() :=
R
u(d();) d().3 In our
special case with a simple state space and L's state-independent preferences, U() = u(d()).
The expected value of the mechanism for L is EU() =
P
i piU(i). The mechanism is
preferred by L only if
P
i piU(i) > U(
P
i pii) = U(0). It implies that U(q) must be
convex at a point 0. In contrast, with concavity, U() exhibits risk-aversion, and lobbying
mechanism is not implemented if L has veto on its use. Thus, a key issue in lobbying is to
determine the shape of U().
The shape of U() is based on two things, (i) whether PM's policy d() is concave or
convex in , and (ii) whether L's payo is concave or convex in d. In our special case,
it is normally assumed that L's payo is convex in d, and the single important property
3Notice that even if L may have a dierent posterior than the PM, we must use the PM's posterior. The
reason is that the value of a mechanism will be ex ante expected value, where information is symmetric, hence
the L's ex ante belief conditional of learning that the PM will have belief  must also be .
10is concavity or convexity of function d(). For a nite D, d() is a step function at 
where PM changes the policy. These discontinuities make concavities and convexities at
points parameter-specic (see Dahm and Porteiro 2008b) and also produce discontinuities
in the parameters of the persuasion mechanisms (such as parameters characterizing signal
and message technologies). For instance, Bennedsen and Feldman (2006) separately analyze
changes of posteriors that are small enough (weak signals) and large enough (strong signals).
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) show that if L can design a persuasion mechanism arbi-
trarily, subject only to Bayes-plausibility, then persuasion works whenever (i) default policy
is not the rst-best for L and (ii) in the neighborhood around prior 0, d() is constant. The
idea is based on showing that Bayes-plausible persuasion mechanisms implement posteriors in
the convex hull of U(), C(U;). The above conditions imply that U(0) is in the interior of
C(U;), hence there is a mechanism that implements a Bayes-plausible convex combination
of payos in posteriors, U(), such that EU() > U(0). This process of concavication has
been used in a variety of similar communication contexts, e.g., in Brocas and Carillo (2007).
One option to avoid step-wise indirect utility is to add such structure to the problem that
the PM's optimal policy is stochastic in posteriors on fundamentals (see Dahm and Porteiro
2008a). Suppose the states of the world are characterized by two independent dimensions
(;r), a fundamental dimension and a PM's type (e.g., ideology, risk aversion, or relative
weights attached to contributions). The PM type is private information that inuences only
v(), but no other payo, and the PM cannot communicate her type. A persuasion mechanism
is invariant to the PM's type, hence implies a distribution of posteriors where the densities are
constant in the type-dimension, and we may let () := (;r). Then, discontinuity in U()
may disappear, since each d(()) is constructed as an expected policy from a distribution
of PM-types, not as a (deterministic) policy of a single PM.
As a result, the concavity and convexity of the shape of the distribution of PM-types
becomes the third parameter that aects whether lobbying mechanism is desirable. In our
special setting, with a parameter r 2 [0;1], suppose that PM's payos from `tting' the
right policy are v(dl;l) = r and v(dl;h) = 1   r. The payos from a policy mismatch is
normalized to zero, v(dl;h) = v(dh;l) = 0, and also the default policy d0 gives only zero.
Thus, d(;r) = dl if   r and d(;r) = dh if   r. Then, with any distribution of
PM's types F(r), L's expected payo is U() = Pr(dh) = Pr(r  ) = F(). The value
of the persuasion mechanism depends only on concavities and convexities in the distribution
F(r). In this context, it is clear that Dahm and Porteiro's (2008a) results crucially hinge on
risk-neutrality that is imposed by the assumption of a uniform distribution, F(r) = r.
There is also a long tradition of a single-dimensional spatial modeling,  = D  R,
where optimal policy is a linear function of the expected state e := E, d(e) = e. L's
preferences are either monotonic in policy d 2 D, or exhibit a constant bias , hence the
L's optimal policy is  + . An extension is counteractive lobbying in Cotton (2009), where
the state of fundamentals is two-dimensional, 1  2, and the policy space D is single-
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d(1;e;2;e) = 1;e   2;e.
3.2 Players' instruments and commitments
3.2.1 L's instruments
In this review, we restrict attention only to instruments that target a single PM, and policies
that dier only in content, not in other aspects such as durability of inuence (c.f. Harstad
and Svensson 2011). The literature analyzes predominantly ve instruments of L's political
inuence:
 Commitment to a platform. If the right to set a policy is sold or auctioned to a single
winner, the competing lobbies may commit to a platform that will be implemented
conditional on winning the right.
 Search for veriable evidence. For search, observability is crucial as it isolates no-search
subgame from the subgame with signals produced by search, and the role of PM's ex-
pectations of search in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium diminishes to zero. Unobservable
search requires barriers both on the PM's side (e.g. prohibitively costly monitoring)
and the L's side (e.g., missing incentive to use credible reporting or prohibitively costly
reporting).4 Unobservability brings in at least three eects: (i) First, the set of multiple
equilibria tends to enlarge. (ii) Second, the PM knows that extra search is opportunis-
tic (to get better evidence and hide bad evidence), hence anticipates moral hazard.
The equilibrium amount of search tends to increase. (iii) Third, L may be subject to
pessimistic PM's expectations, called as `curse of lobbying' or `trap of information ac-
quisition', which depresses the L's value of the persuasion mechanism even below zero
(Lagerl of 1997).
 Persuasion by admissible messages. In cheap-talk games, messages are unveriable,
hence any message is admissible. In persuasion games, messages are veriable, but
presented evidence may be aected by communicating incomplete evidence (strategic
concealing). Normally, concealed evidence is not used any further. Stone (2011) devel-
oped an interesting extension of strategic concealing where concealed evidence may be
put into public domain. Therein, the evidence is only randomly observed by the PM,
but the PM is not able to recognize the source of the evidence.
 Signaling or screening by costly actions. In signaling or screening games, a costly mes-
sage is not veriable. An extension is a two-level `pay-and-lobby' game where lobbies
with access have to communicate only veriable messages. Interestingly, verication has
4For the sake of interpretation, it is worth mentioning that with a single-type L, unobservability matters only
in the construction of the equilibrium, since any L's action correctly inferred and expected in the equilibrium.
12a very limited role in equilibrium; it only conrms the correct posteriors of the winner's
type that is inferred from the level of contributions (Cotton 2009).
 Contributions. One of the main properties of contributions is whether the payments
are contingent upon a policy, rent, or any other observable variable. We can identify
four forms of the payments. (i) Policy-contingent compensations in the bargaining
stage or in menu auctions. Notice that the shape of the marginal cost of compensation
aects concavity vs. linearity in U() in search games with ex post contributions. For
example, Dahm and Porteiro (2008b) have an increasing marginal cost thus additional
local concavity, whereas Bennedsen and Feldman (2006) assume a constant marginal
cost. (ii) Bids in standard auctions that are paid only by winners. (iii) Investments in
a contest for a policy rent or PM's attention. These payments are irreversible hence
not contingent. (iv) Tickets for access. Again, the tickets are irreversible payments. In
addition, this is the only type of contributions that serves an informational role, namely
in the context of two-level `pay-and-lobby' games.
3.2.2 L's commitments
Commonly, L has signicantly less commitment devices at disposal than PM. Still, two types
of L's commitments can be found in lobbying models. The rst is ex post policy-contingent
payment. For example, in a menu auction, lobbyists commit to payments conditional on policy
adopted (see Bennedsen and Feldman 2006). In Tovar (2011), contribution is also contingent
upon the state of the world, and a state-and-policy-contingent ex post payment represent the
strongest type of L's commitment to an ex post payment. Notice that in an unregulated
environment, the lack of L's commitment could theoretically be replaced by a commitment
by PM to request payments aront and then return some of them back.
In contests, a winner normally realizes his or her rst-best policy. The second type of
L's commitment is when contestants commit to realizing a certain compromising outcome
(policy/platform commitment/announcement). This commitment strategically decreases the
opponents' valuations. Epstein and Nitzan (2004) show in a spatial setting that if valuations
are endogenous due to the option of policy commitments, moderation of aggressiveness of
the opponent is a rst-order eect to the loss of value from own policy. M unster (2006)
adds that moderation is incomplete for imperfect discrimination, and complete for perfect
discrimination.
3.2.3 PM's objectives
The rst generation of the rent seeking contests limited the PM's role only to the distribution
of the prize by the rules of CSF. However, an implicit idea was that the PM intentionally
generates rents as contest prizes because he or she values benets associated with the rent-
seeking investments. The early contest literature thus focused on the contest design for a
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To make PM's decision-making more realistic, one may postulate a PM with a mixed
objective who shapes parameters of the contest (see Epstein and Nitzan 2006). Then, the
very rst choice of the PM is to determine whether to use the contest at all or rather hand
out the prize to the highest-valuation group. For a mixed-objective PM, another important
strategic variable becomes the presence of policy restrictions that bind the contest winner,
change contestants' valuations, and also their eorts. To sum up, a mixed objective PM solves
a number of tradeos before initiating a contest that are absent for a purely revenue-oriented
PM.
A mixed objective is present not only in contests, but also in menu-auction, pay-for-
access models, and it naturally takes place in bargaining between L and PM. For strategic
information transmission per se, contributions are not present, hence the tradeo between
policy and revenue does not exist. However, in multiple means models that apply information
transmission in an early stage, the exact shape of PM's motivation plays a largely signicant
role for the design of contributions schemes. The key issue is how to structure the interaction
to both extract information and collect payments for a mixed-objective PM. This topic is now
at the frontier of the research interest. For example, Cotton (2011) identied the optimal
contest for PM's attention for lexicographic preferences that value revelation in the rst place
and payments in the second place.
3.2.4 PM's commitments
The literature frequently constrains the PM in the interaction with lobbies, hence either
implicitly assumes commitment devices or works with time-inconsistent behavior. The most
complex commitment is the commitment to the rules of a contest, including the use of collected
payments (e.g., the shape of CSF), the promise to sell policy (not only agenda or access),
the lack of separate bilateral bargaining with additional side-payments, and the promise to
keep policy restrictions (agenda restrictions) prior to the contest. The incentive of the PM to
break a promise moreover varies in parameters. Consider three examples:
1. Cotton (2009) lets PM choose ex ante from two dierent classes of all-pay auctions. In
one, the right to set policy is sold, and in the other, it is access that is sold. Both are
organized exactly in the same way and dier only in the last moment, after payments
are collected. Therein, the PM has an incentive to switch from policy-sale rules to
access-sale rules because it implies a policy improvement without extra cost.
2. The promise to sell policy may be suboptimal ex post if payments reveal additional
information. Consider a symmetric setting with two lobbies and multiple policy choices
in the spirit of Bennedsen and Feldman (2006). If two oppositely extreme groups oer
similar amounts, then PM updates priors very little and prefers the neutral default
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dictate to identify the buyer of the policy and realize his or her policy. (See also Section
3.3.4 on the role of default policy.)
3. Time-inconsistency may also be present when the PM sets agenda in Stage 1 (Epstein
and Nitzan 2006b). The PM thereby restricts the policy set of the winner of the contest
and thereby changes valuations and eorts. Once the winner is determined, PM may
have an incentive to lift the restriction and extend the reduced agenda set in order to
generate a better policy both for the contest winner and himself/herself.
Another PM's commitment is commitment to verication, including random auditing (see
Cotton 2011). Consider pay-for-access models, where lobbies truthfully reveal evidence by
contributions because their equilibrium expectations involve that verication will be under-
taken (Cotton 2009). If verication is costless for PM, then commitment to verication is
not necessary. But costless verication would then be inconsistent with the assumption that
access is rationed due to limited (costly) attention. In contrast, if verication is costly, then
ex post verication is time-inconsistent and an announcement to verify must be binding.
The existence of the PM's commitment may be partly explained by strategic delegation
to intermediaries such as aides and lobbyists. Specically for contests with imperfect discrim-
ination, there have been several attempts to build microfoundations for imperfectly discrim-
inating CSF. Konrad (2009) recognizes three derivations of microfoundations for CSFs: (i)
axiomatic, (ii) stochastic, and (iii) innovation-race based. The stochastic derivation is mostly
product of imperfect monitoring of contributions (Jia 2008). In an innovation race, a valuable
skill that is rewarded by PM is acquired randomly. There is not a fundamental dierence
between the two explanations: In either case, players eorts are subject to a shock, either a
shock into perception of the eorts (imperfect monitoring) or a shock to the production of
the eorts (innovation race).
3.2.5 PM's environment
The PM may be restricted not only by its commitments but also by regulations dictated by the
exogenous environment. For example, PM may be subject to mandatory disclosure of private
information which aects equilibrium bids of lobbies in menu auctions. Felgenhauer (2010)
examines information asymmetry where it is the government or bureaucracy that disposes
with private information, and lobbies engage in menu auction contributions. From the PM's
perspective, the regime of secrecy (no mandatory disclosure of PM's information) is preferred
to transparency as it raises expected equilibrium bids; hence transparency must be imposed by
regulation. From the social point of view, however, transparency is preferred only if lobbies are
suciently similar, hence their equilibrium bids do not change the PM's default policy. (The
default policy is set to be socially rst-best policy.) If lobbies are suciently asymmetric,
transparency cannot protect the default policy. Secrecy provides partial protection to the
15default policy, since it involves mixed strategies where default policy remains with a positive
probability.
3.3 Communication
A general lobbying game starts with common priors 0. Nature selects unobservable  2 .
Then, we have to distinguish between models with pure persuasion, and models of search
and persuasion. In pure persuasion models, the signal is exogenously acquired by L and a
persuasion mechanism applies directly. In search and persuasion models, L makes a decision
on whether to acquire a signal or not, and then communicates.5
3.3.1 Persuasion mechanism
A persuasion mechanism is a combination of a signal and message technology. The signal
technology is a family of distributions f(sj)g2 over S, where a signal realized is s 2 S.
A message technology is the other component of the persuasion mechanism. For messages
m 2 M, it involves a family of cost functions c(js), where the cost of message m after
observing s is c(mjs) 2 R+ [ 1 (innite cost is used to characterize veriability). Often,
M = P(), where P() is the set of all subsets of .
Notice how restrictions on message costs serve to dene veriability. In cheap talk games,
the cost is zero (or constant), hence signal-independent. For persuasion with veriable ev-
idence (Milgrom 1981), the signal is perfectly informative, message space is M = P(),
message cost is constant if L does not say an explicit lie (s 2 m) and innity for an explicit
lie (s 2 :m). In an honest mechanism, L must tell the `whole' truth, and nothing but the
truth, hence the cost is constant only if the whole truth is revealed (s = m), and is innity
otherwise (s 6= m).
How to interpret messages? Traditionally, messages are assumed to have literal meaning.
In cheap-talk (signal technology is perfectly informative for L, message cost is zero or constant
across all messages), the set of the presented messages is completely state-independent. In
persuasion games, a signal involves observable evidence (e.g., logical arguments or documents
that cannot be fabricated) that restricts the set of plausible messages. Messages are then
veriable, and the set of the admissible messages is signal-dependent. In persuasion games, a
standard message set includes also an `empty message' equal to the message set with priors.
What is important about a message is not only its substantive or literal content that is
veried by evidence, but also the signaling function that is veried by willingness to pro-
duce that costly signal. Thus, the information received from a message has two dimensions.
Relevance of the dimensions determine whether it is money or words that speak louder. In
5Since we have common priors, this action cannot have any strategic role, and possibility not to acquire a
signal is only important to study the participation condition. With asymmetry, search has a third, signaling
eect upon the PM's posteriors.
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3.3.2 Signal technology
In the classic information transmission setups, involving cheap talk and persuasion games,
L exogenously receives a perfectly informative private signal, and the setting can be stud-
ied as one of pure asymmetric information. A dierent case is when L has no informa-
tion and may obtain a signal. Two major signalling technologies (a.k.a. search/evidence-
production/investigation functions) appear in the literature:
 Hard evidence. Signal space includes only two outcomes, truth and `no-evidence', S =
f;?g. For s = ?, the only admissible message (not innite cost) is m = ?. For s = ,
the set of admissible messages are S. Thus, hard evidence cannot be fabricated, but
unfavorable evidence can be presented as lack of evidence. This setting is used also in
search models that use contest with evidence (Lagerl of 2007). The signal distributions
normally feature a common precision level, (j) = ! 2 [0;1]; 2 . Thus, in our
special case, ex ante probabilities of (l;?;h) are (!(1   0);1   !;!0).
 Noisy signals. Signal space does not include no-evidence, but noise over all states of the
world, S = . In our special case, let a common precision be again (j) = ! 2 [0;1].
The ex ante probabilities of (l;h) are now (!(1 0)+(1 !)0;!0+(1 !)(1 0)).
(See also Brocas and Carrillo, 2007.)
Hard evidence is not necessarily the preferred evidentiary structure for L. Consider our
setup where the PM has symmetric preferences and symmetric priors 0 = 1
2, hence selects
d() = dl if  < 1
2 and d() = dh if  > 1
2. Recall that the L's expected payo is dened
by the probability of getting a favorable policy dh, Pr(dh). For both evidentiary structures,
the probability of favorable policy is equal to the probability of delivering favorable evidence,
Pr(d = dh) = Pr(s = h), and the probability of unfavorable policy is equal to probability of
delivering unfavorable evidence, Pr(d = dl) = Pr(s 2 fl;?g). This is because the relevant
posterior associated with the favorable evidence satises h  1
2 (i.e., dh is implemented),
and the relevant posterior associated with unfavorable evidence satises l  1
2 (i.e., dl is
implemented). Thus we may compare the structures by studying only the probability of
delivering favorable evidence.
For search with hard evidence, there are three outcomes (l;?;h) with probabilities
(!
2;1 !; !
2). The unfavorable evidence l is concealed, and the reported outputs are (?;h),
with probabilities (1   !
2; !
2). For a noisy signal, there are two outcomes (l;h) with proba-
bilities (1
2; 1
2), and both are disclosed. As a result, L's expected payo in the two structures
are !
2  1
2, and the noisy technology is relatively superior to the hard-evidence technology.
173.3.3 Search
Often, the lobbyists select from the family of evidence-production functions with dierent
precisions !, where a search cost function C(!) is convex. The selected precision level may
be the L's private information. The quality of the signal is not only subject to choice of L,
but may be also strategically distorted by the PM. As discussed in the stochastic foundations
for CSFs, the low elasticity of prize to relative eort in CSF may be due to noise about
lobbyists eorts. This noise may be introduced strategically by delegation to a sta member
who commits systematic errors.
Can quality be interpreted interchangeably as quantity? Lagerl of (2007), Dahm and
Porteiro (2008a) and Henry (2009) interpret the level of precision as the amount of lobbying,
hence their setup makes no distinction between the two. The dierence actually might be
suppressed for private tests (or unobservable search), where outcomes of search can be jammed
into a single message. However, with public tests or observable (repeated) search, quantity
and quality are dierent features. For example, Brocas and Carrillo (2007) characterize the
optimal stopping rule in the ow of public signals (i.e., the optimal quantity) as a function of
the quality of a single signal.
Another issue for search function is specialization. In the presence of revolving-door lob-
byists, there should not be a fundamental dierence in the available technologies between
PM and L, and the PM may dispose with the option of the extra search. Notice also that
specialization implies sequential interaction, hence rst-mover (dis)advantages to lobbyists,
and second-mover (dis)advantages to policy-makers. Specialization thus becomes less realistic
once PM nds Stackelberg leadership more valuable.
The literature makes a dierence between a private test/search and public test: For private
search, it is possible to withhold evidence and report an empty message. Observability of
search then makes a dierence. With observable search, PM interprets empty message as
both unsuccessful search (no evidence) and concealed evidence. With unobservable search, an
empty message covers not two but three events at the same time: no search, search without
evidence, and search with unfavorable evidence.
When test is public, evidence cannot be withheld. Imposing public test (or mandatory
disclosure rule) makes observable not only search outcome, but also search itself. Thus,
analyzing the eect of the public test relative to the private test crucially depends on whether
we start with observable or unobservable search. With observable search, the public test
only separates unfavorable evidence from no-evidence. With unobservable search, public test
separates no-search, no-evidence, and unfavorable evidence, and the eects of mandatory
disclosure are therefore more complex.
183.3.4 Empty message
A literal meaning of empty message, m = ?, is to say nothing but conrm priors. In the
absence of search, an empty message is just one out of all messages. With search and private
test, four options arise for the interpretation of the empty message:
1. Absence of no-evidence outcome (? 2 :S), observable search: This is a standard per-
suasion game preceded by search in an early stage, and M = P(). Under veriability
restrictions, an empty message has zero strategic eect, since full disclosure appears
(Milgrom 1981, Henry 2009). The idea is that unless private evidence is the worst pos-
sible, it is ex post better to separate oneself from types with the worse evidence. This
`sharpening' of the messages ultimately leads to full revelation where truth and nothing
but the truth is communicated.
2. Absence of no-evidence outcome, unobservable search: An empty message is now used
to conceal unfavorable evidence behind no-search. For example, in Henry (2009), all
positive signals are reported, all negative signals are withheld, and the Receiver (PM)
understands that the hidden signals are negative. Revelation is incomplete, because
the number of positive signals only probabilistically indicates the number of negative
signals.
3. No-evidence outcome (? 2 S), observable search: An empty message now captures
also the existence of no-evidence outcome. Again, the empty message is ex post always
used strategically to conceal bad evidence, namely to conceal bad evidence behind no-
evidence.
4. No evidence, unobservable search: In this most complex case, an empty message jams
no-search, unfavorable evidence, and no-evidence.
We have seem that the empty message interacts especially with no-evidence outcome. One
eect of the empty message in the presence of no-evidence outcome is to bring asymmetry into
an otherwise symmetric model. Let us return to a comparison of hard-evidence vs. noisy signal
technologies. Consider our special case with a symmetric prior 0 = 1
2 and observable search
for hard evidence with no-evidence outcome, where the precision level is ! 2 [0;1]. Search
delivers either of three outcomes, s 2 fl;?;hg. L discloses only two outcomes, m 2 f?;hg;
unfavorable evidence is hidden by showing no evidence, m(l) = ?. Unconditional probability
of obtaining no evidence is Pr(?) = 1   !.
By Bayes rule, the relevant posteriors write ? := Pr(hj?) = 1 !
2 ! 2 (0; 1
2) and h :=
Pr(hjh) = 1. This creates asymmetry in posteriors (?;h) around the prior 0 = 1
2. The
asymmetry is important if there is a default policy d0 that serves as PM's insurance against
extremes, for instance by providing a state-invariant payo. In our setting specically, it is
important whether the posterior ? implements a default policy, d(?) = d0. If so, then the
19default policy fully absorbs (neutralizes) the indirect cost of search associated with posteriors
at empty message, which makes value of search positive for L.
In contrast, for noisy search without no-evidence outcome, search leads to two outcomes.
The relevant posteriors are (l;h) = (Pr(hjl);Pr(hjh)) = (1   !;!). With symmetric
neutralization around 0 = 1
2, either both posteriors are neutralized, d(l) = d(h), or none
of posteriors is neutralized, d(l) 6= d(0) 6= d(h). Unlike for hard evidence search, noisy
search (where errors are symmetric) is either uninformative or the indirect search cost cannot
be absorbed. In contrast to comparison in Section 3.3.1, this particular aspect makes noisy
technology relatively inferior to the hard-evidence technology.
4 Selected topics
4.1 To lobby or not to lobby
4.1.1 Single lobby
In the context of a single lobby that conducts observable search, we have stressed that the
key thing is the property of L's expected indirect utility in posteriors, U(). In the absence
of contribution subgames, this indirect utility is derived from the PM's policy decision based
on his or her upper envelope of expected utilities of all policies, evaluated at the respective
posterior. The existence of policy-switches in  makes the shape of the L's expected indirect
utility generally ambiguous. Specically, conicting preferences between PM and L imply
that the L's utility is step-wise at the critical posteriors (i.e., at levels that make PM change
his or her optimal policy), which implies that the utility is neither convex nor concave. With a
larger number of policies, the number of policy-switches increases and complexity grows. For
instance, some dierences between Dahm and Porteiro (2008b) and Bennedsen and Feldman
(2006) stem only from the fact that the former have two policies, while the latter allow for
three policies.
With steps in U(), an important variable is the relative position of the priors to the
critical level of posteriors. In our symmetric setting with two policies, fdl;dhg, PM selects
d() = dl if  < 1=2 and d() = dh if   1=2; the critical posterior that denes a policy-
switch is  := 1=2. The incentive to lobby can be found either directly (by calculating expected
payos) or indirectly (by checking concavity or convexity at prior). First, if 0 > , L never
has a strict incentive to lobby since default policy dh is her rst-best policy. Alternatively, we
may say that search brings a negative expected payo because of concavity at point 0 over
alternatives (?;h). In contrary, if 0 < , then L's search for hard evidence with success rate
! implies h = 1, policy d(h) = dh, and gain 1, all with probability !0. With probability
1   !0, an empty message is presented, and the posterior is ? =
(1 !)0
1 !0 < 0 < 1
2: This
implies policy d(?) = dl, and zero gain. As a result, the L's expected payo is !0  0,
and L always lobbies. Notice also that the positive expected payo of search is equivalent to
20a convexity at point 0 over (?;h).
With subsequent contribution subgames, the PM's policy choice in each posterior is aected
by contributions oered by L, and the structure of the interaction can be modeled as non-
cooperative bargaining. There, the additionally important aspects are the existence of surplus,
bargaining powers, and transaction costs. Consider our special case and let the PM have value
r from correctly tting dl policy with state l, and (1   r) from correctly tting dh policy
with h, where r > 1. Payos from mists are normalized to zero. Without contributions,
the critical level for a policy-switch is  := r, and d() = dl if  <  and d() = dh if   .
To change policy from dl to dh, the PM has to be compensated by at least maxf0;(r  )g,
hence total surplus from the policy change is S() := 1   (r   ). If S()  0, there is no
compensation. The critical level for a compensation to be feasible is at  := r 1
 . Thus, with
contribution subgames, we have (i) no compensation for  2 [0;), (ii) positive compensation
for  2 [;), and (iii) no compensation for  2 [;1]. Let ^ U() be L's equilibrium payo in
the contribution subgame, where ^ U()  U() since a non-contribution subgame that does
not aect the PM's posteriors can always be chosen by L. We have (i) ^ U() = U() = 0 for
 2 [0;), (ii) ^ U() 2 [0;1] for  2 [;), and (iii) ^ U() = U() = 1 for  2 [;1].
Unless PM extracts full surplus, we have that ^ U() > 0 for intermediate beliefs  2 [;).
Since zero surplus exists at low beliefs, we have, around  = , that there are points at
which ^ U() is convex. If L can extract either some but not all surplus, then ^ U() < 1 for all
intermediate beliefs. Thus, at  = , there is a step in ^ U(). Therefore, in the neighborhood
of , there are points where ^ U() is concave. In other words, unless L extracts full surplus,
the step in L's indirect utility exists both with and without contributions. Bennedsen and
Feldman (2006) serve as a good example how these problems are suppressed: The extra
risk-proclivity associated with zero surplus around  is entirely avoided by assuming positive
surplus for all posteriors. Secondly, the convexity at  is eliminated by vesting L with full
bargaining power.
Alternatively, Dahm and Porteiro (2008a,b) construct the contribution stage as a unilat-
eral purchase of extra pressure. They start with the PM who is expected to set policy dh
with probability . (Recall a stochastic PM and a uniform distribution of types, F(r) = r.)
Hence, in the absence of contributions, U() = , and L is risk-neutral. Their novelty is that
extra pressure  2 R+ can be purchased at a constant cost c > 0. The pressure modies the
posteriors over the states as if a simple rae applies. Namely, the total `evidence' in favor of
h is  + , and total `evidence' in favor of l is 1   . As a result, ^ U() = Pr(dh) =
+
1+:
Solving for the equilibrium pressure, (), we obtain that the pressure is decreasing and
concave in the posterior , and the expected L's utility is surprisingly convex in the posterior.
A lobby becomes risk-loving, independently on the level of posteriors. This modeling of
the contribution/pressure subgame has nevertheless a couple of drawbacks, including lack of
foundations for the selected functional form and sensitivity to the distribution of PM-types (as
discussed in Section 3.1). Moreover, consider the presence of counteractive lobbying. If two
21competing groups have identical pressure technologies and valuations, then their equilibrium
marginal returns from pressure investments (1;2) must be identical, hence the levels of
evidence must equal,  + 
1 = 1    + 
2, and the equilibrium posterior is 1
2. Each group's
share of the prize is one half, and expected payo of search is for each lobby linear in the
posteriors. As a result, each lobby remains risk-neutral.
To sum up, lobbying by means of search and subsequent persuasion tends to occur with (i)
a low search cost, (ii) large bargaining power of the lobby in the contribution subgame, (iii)
unfavorable status quo that increases the gain in the case of success and lowers the indirect
cost of search, and (iv) large stakes.
4.1.2 Multiple lobbies
With competition of heterogenous lobbies, the participation decision of individual lobbies
and the aggregate level of lobbying are potentially separated issues. To start with, focus
on the results achieved for contest over policy rent. This literature has produced a bulk of
comparative-statics observations on how aggregate and individual lobbying changes with (i)
the level of discrimination, (ii) contribution caps, (iii) player exclusion, and (iv) the number
of prizes.
A rst general result is that, ceteris paribus, perfect discrimination induced more eort
for symmetry and imperfect discrimination works better for large asymmetry (Hang 2002;
Epstein and Nitzan 2006b; Wang 2010). The explanation goes through participation decision
of less interested players. Non-participation of an individual contestant has a rst-order
eect on relaxing the overall contest activity, hence values of the discrimination parameter
that encourage non-participation are suboptimal. This issue can be best addressed if both the
level of discrimination and relative productivity of eorts can be simultaneously optimized.
Then, an all-pay auction with its conditionally optimal relative productivity raises more than
any logit CSF with its conditional relative productivity, including Tullock's lottery (Epstein,
Mealem, and Nitzan 2011).
Participation of low-valuation lobbies may also be encouraged by setting a ceiling to high-
level payments. A standard eect of such a cap is to decrease both the highest payments
and the total expenditures, hence it represents, from the perspective of the PM a costly
prize redistribution. This property nevertheless varies in the contest success function. While
for Tullock's lottery, the aggregate expenditures do fall (Hang 2002), Che and Gale (1998)
show that in all-pay auction, a rigid contribution cap makes the low-valuation lobbyist more
proactive, and total expenditures may even rise. Kaplan and Wettstein (2006) argue that a
non-rigid contribution cap (i.e., discontinuous but not innite marginal cost) re-establishes the
result that aggregate contributions decrease in an all-pay auction with a cap. Che and Gale
(2006) nevertheless show that even with a non-rigid cap, the non-intuitive eect emerges as
long as the relative eect of `leveling of the playing eld' is strong enough. This only conrms
the intuition that too large asymmetry in contests is, from revenue-maximization perspective,
22not desirable. For recent contributions, see also Pastine and Pastine (2010) and Grossman
and Dietl (2011).
Does the structure of prizes matter in a contest? Can prize redistribution induce wider
participation and stimulate total eort? For all-pay auctions, Siegel (2009) derives the number
of participating players as a linear function of the number of prizes. In a fairly general
setting, he shows that increasing the number of prizes and thereby attracting additional
players makes existing players weakly worse o. In a review of multiple-prize contests, Sisak
(2009) demonstrates that adding an additional prize to encourage additional participation
has ambiguous properties on individual eorts of contestants. Epstein and Nitzan (2006a)
show that by suciently asymmetrically reducing the prize (valuations) for all players may
paradoxically boost total expenditures.
For the PM, it pays o to stimulate participation even if inuence is only through com-
munication. With informational rent-seeking, majority of models suggest that the PM prefers
more intense competition with a larger number of competitors. In Bennedsen and Feldman
(2006), competition increases the incentive for search because unsuccessful search is inter-
preted against the lobbying group only if the other group is also unsuccessful. If contributions
is allowed, then this eect represents an information rent to the group with less informative
technology in the case both groups are unsuccessful. This serves as extra motivation for
participation of a weaker player.
When informational lobbying yields a collective benet but side-payment gives a private
benet, then non-participation is dierently motivated for each of the instruments. Non-
participation in lobbying activities is primarily motivated by free-riding, and the total amount
of lobbying depends on whether demand for lobbying benets exhibits neutrality or non-
neutrality known from public good games. In contrast, non-participation in contributions
is motivated by the absence of bargaining surplus. An example of interaction of these two
instruments is Polk and Schmutzler (2005). They examine a tradeo of rms that select from
collective-good lobbying (industry-specic benets) and private-good lobbying (rm-specic
benets), and show that the option of the private-good lobbying crowds out the use of the
collective-good lobbying.
4.1.3 Evidence
Corporate political inuence has traditionally been measured by campaign contributions and
the exact inuence has been ascribed to buying favorable roll call vote. The results of roll call
voting studies exploiting the U.S. evidence since 1970s are nevertheless inconclusive, and the
structure of campaign contributions also reveals that the campaign contributions are in fact
more individual and not through Political Action Committees within rms (Ansolabehere et
al. 2003).
Lobbying expenses represent an alternative measure of political inuence. Data on lobby-
ing outlays are nonetheless notoriously hard to collect, and the only extra evidence of lobbying
23beyond survey data is from participation in interest group associations. The virtual lack of
evidence is mostly related to weak or non-existent lobbying regulations, even in developed
countries such at the EU countries (Chari, Hogan and Murphy 2010.) The major signicant
exception is the United States, where the Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995 has revealed rela-
tively clean data on the salaries of lobbyists and their sta, prices per reports, and fees for
expert consultants.
In the U.S., the magnitude of reported lobbying expenses turns out to be of a higher
order than direct payments. Ansolabehere et al. (2003) nd for rms with both PACs and
a Washington lobby, the ratio of lobbying expenditures to PAC contributions is 10 to 1.
Similarly Bennedsen and Feldman (2002) show that the top 100 contributing interest groups
gave a total $144 million to federal candidates during the 1998 election cycle, and spent over
$1 billion on lobbying activities during that period. Lobbying also brings large returns, but
of a much lower scale than previously estimated returns to campaign contributions. Richter
et al. (2009) measure quid-pro-quo in terms of tax benets (tax breaks including R-D credits
and tax depreciation schedules) and observe that for each additional $1 spent on lobbying, a
mean rm receives $6-$20 tax benets. A downside of these particular estimates is that they
do not treat the potential endogeneity of the lobbying rms.
Once the size of the market and relative protability is measured, the next step is to
investigate the determinants of lobbying. De Figueiredo and Cameron (2009) exploit the
institutional and political variation across the U.S. states. Their rst result is that ideological
distance between the lobbying group and the legislature increases outlays; this complies with
a standard signaling model with non-veriable information and endogenous cost where a
stronger signal is needed to persuade the legislature if the lobby's bias is larger (Austen-Smith
1995). For corporations specically, the distance is coded zero for Republican legislature and
one for Democratic legislature. Their second result shows the strong positive eect of the
budgeting cycle upon the total lobbying outlays (a 23% increase during a budget year),
independent on the electoral cycle. Also, the length of the legislative session matters; each
extra 10 days results in 6% increase in the lobbying rates. Hence, corporate inuence is much
less related to electoral campaigns than previously thought. Thirdly, the size of the legislature
does not matter. The authors' interpretation is that lobbying brings a non-rival benet to
legislators, not a private good.
Another topic are determinants on the industry- or rm-level. In a sample of lobbying
expenditures for tax benets, Richter et al. (2009) show that lobbying expenditures follow
a skewed, power-law distribution, and only a small fraction of rms do lobby. Bombardini
and Trebbi (2009) examine incentives to lobby collectively. Sectors characterized by a higher
degree of competition (more substitutable products and a lower concentration of production)
tend to lobby more together through a sector-wide trade association, while sectors with higher
concentration and more dierentiated. Their idea is that individual lobbying pays o only
in oligopolies where product-specic protection may increase both prices and prots (recall
24tax-overshifting); in competitive markets, these measures increase prices but decrease prots.
4.2 Strategic substitution and complementarity
4.2.1 Theory
Does the possibility of providing direct contributions aect the usefulness of lobbying? And
vice versa, does lobbying change the eect of direct contributions? In the theoretical litera-
ture, the instruments are typically pure or impure substitutes. Consider an increase in the
bargaining power of a single lobby. In Section 4.1, we have seen that it makes a lobby more
likely to search. At the same time, the increase implies less payments in each relevant contri-
bution subgame. Overall, we observe less payments and more lobbying, i.e., substitution.
A dierent story emerges is when we study the eects of deregulation of one instrument
upon the equilibrium level of the other instrument. For this purpose, Bennedsen and Feldman
(2006) have built out a setting which allows for 16 congurations of multi-player lobbying:
un/observable search, strong/weak signals, with/without contributions, and with/without
lobbying. The eects of introduction of contributions upon lobbying are conditional upon
participation, which depends upon asymmetry of valuations. For symmetry, contributions
intensify the competition in terms of informational search (complementarity). For suciently
asymmetric lobbies, introduction of contributions implies that the group with the less eective
search technology decides not to participate in info-collection and the decision-maker receives
less information (substitution).
To return to our setting with a single lobby, Bennedsen and Feldman (2006) derive that
for observable search and contributions, lobbying is fully crowded out (pure substitution). We
will show that this striking result crucially hinges upon two assumptions: (i) Surplus from
attaining L's rst-best policy is positive, S() > 0 for  2 [0;1]. (ii) PM has zero bargaining
power, hence her utility is constant with introduction of contributions.
To see crowding-out, denote the equilibrium L's compensations in Stage 2 as C(). We
know that the PM's indirect utility W() is derived as an upper envelope of the expected
utilities over policies, W() := v(d();). Since v(d;) is linear in  for each d 2 D, the
upper envelope from the linear functions is convex. Now, by the two assumptions stated
above, C() = W()   W(dh;), which is a dierence between a convex and linear function;
i.e., C() is convex. L's expected utility is ^ U() = 1 C(). As a dierence between a linear
and convex function, it is a concave. With a concave ^ U(), L is risk-averse and does not
lobby. Lobbying is crowded-out by the introduction of contributions. By eliminating any of
the two assumptions, pure substitution (full crowding out) is no longer present.
To receive complementarity requires a special framework. Dahm and Porteiro (2008a,b)
derive complementarity in the case of single lobby for high costs of pressure in the contribution
subgame. However, this result is derived in the setup with contribution subgame dened as a
pressure subgame, where the shape of U() depends on the distribution of PM's types. Hence,
25it is not robust to other ways of modeling contribution subgames and to other distributions
of PM's types, as discussed in Section 4.1.1.
If lobbying and payments are assumed to achieve two dierent things, not just a policy
change, then they can be complements by assumption. In pay-to-play politics, only those
who pay the access fee (or pay the highest fee) are allowed to present their evidence (Austen-
Smith 1995, Lohmann 1995, Cotton 2009). Or, lobbying facilitates payments to PM: Da-
mania, Fredriksson and Mani (2004) suppose that lobbying may be directed at undermining
law enforcement, so as to make corruption easier. This complementarity between the two
instruments is generated purely by assumptions on the production of political inuence.
4.2.2 Evidence
The theoretical part has looked separately at direct payments versus information provision.
But, these two are idealized activities that cannot be perfectly disentangled in the empirics
and that capture both legal and illegal activities. An alternative is to examine bribes as a
measure of contributions and political inuence as a measure of lobbying.
Three recent papers examine the strategic substitution between corruption and political
inuence. Chong and Gradstein (2010) exploit World Bank's World Business Environment
Survey survey data and study only the measure of political inuence of rms upon the ex-
ecutive, legislature, and the national level of the ministries. Given that many determinants
may be endogenous to political inuence, they use instrumental variables, namely for the rm
size (legal organization of the rm), rm growth (level of education) and institutional quality
(GDP). With or without instrumental variables, the rm size and low level of institutional
quality are robustly associated with the perception of having more inuence. Much weaker
evidence is for state ownership, exporting rms, and very weak evidence is for competitiveness
of the industry, which is one of the major dierences.
Bennedsen, Feldman, and Lassen (2011) conrm that the stage of development and matu-
rity of a rm is conductive to lobbying. Firm-level determinants aect corruption and political
inuence in the opposite directions. Large, old, government-owned, and export-oriented rms
use more inuence than bribes; smaller rms or rms in a fragmented industry choose cor-
ruption. When using instruments, the inuential rms use less corruption, but corrupting
are not less inuential. They propose the idea of asymmetric substitutes: Strong rms have
access to both political inuence and bribes, whereas weak rms have to resort to corruption
only. The asymmetric substitution is a challenge to competitive informational lobbying whose
main prediction is that the competitors with high stakes bribe under almost any condition.
Kaufmann and Vicente (2011) use country-level evidence from Executive Opinion Survey
2004-2005 of the Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum). Their denition of
Legal Corruption involves variables that proxy lobbying, such as Inuence of Well-Connected
in Procurement, Inuence of Legal Contributions to Political Parties, Independence of the Ju-
diciary from Inuence, Inuence on Laws and Regulations-Respondent's Industry. For Illegal
26Corruption, the variables proxy rather direct payments and bribes, such as Illegal Donations
to Political Parties, Frequency of Bribes in Inuencing Laws and Policies, and Frequency of
Bribes in Procurement. The evidence shows that more of illegal corruption occurs for the
low income levels, low political accountability and high inequality. To conclude, and increase
in income inequality, business cycle slumps, structural changes and pro-competitive practices
make rms more likely to bribe than lobby, be it supply-driven or demand-driven bribes.
A disadvantage of this approach is that that corruption comprises activities targeting
the rule enforcers (with only a small portion of political corruption), whereas lobbying is
directed at rule makers (Campos and Giovannoni 2007; Harstad and Svensson 2011). This
is not perfectly aligned with our theoretical interest on pure political inuence. Once we
mix activities that lead to qualitatively dierent outcomes, the key dierences between the
instruments will be not only in the cost side and externalities they produce, but also in the
properties/qualities of the product, namely (i) durability and (ii) appropriability (collective or
private benet). Then, it will be the barriers to entry and appropriability of lobbying benets
that help to explain to explain stylized facts, e.g. why mainly large rms in developed countries
prefer lobbying to corruption.
4.3 Intermediaries
4.3.1 Theory
Why does the inuence go through intermediaries (lobbyists, lawyers)? Why do politicians
give the right to auction access to specic gate-keepers? And why don't they exploit better
competition between the lobbyists and other producers of relevant expertise?
Except for Johnson (1996), recent economics is silent on the choice between working alone
through establishing a corporate PR oce or hiring a lobbyist. Three groups of tentative
hypotheses are discussed in the empirical literature. The standard arguments for the exis-
tence of the intermediation industry, such as specialization, networks and economies of scale,
apply. Secondly, a corruption-driven hypothesis subscribes to the lack of transparency: an
intermediary is the agent for the `dirty' job assigned by the principal. A successful lobbyist
is a skillful bribe negotiator who charges a high premium for silence and stability of covert
deals and internalizes risks associated with crime detection. The benets to the rm are then
twofold: (i) The cost of detection decreases. (ii) The rules covering third party lobbyists'
conduct are often less restrictive than those covering their employers. For example, in the US
municipal nance industry, underwriters cannot make campaign contributions to those from
whom they solicit business. But an underwriter is free to hire a lobbyist who faces no such
restrictions (Retnasaba 2006).
Alternatively, the intermediaries charge the premium for reputation; investigation and
verication require credible and trustworthy agents. Also, lobbyists may be predominantly
ecient communicators who handle excess of information under time and attention con-
27straints. The lobbyists may not have strong advantage in technical expertise, but they may
still possess with politician-specic expertise such as the knowledge of the politician's con-
stituency. Lobbyists may charge premium stemming purely from social relations, generated
by the fact that barriers to social networks are large relatively to barriers to entry into issue
expertise, where academia and industry experts are available. Finally, we have seen that
the PM prefers imperfectly discriminative contests under asymmetry (recall evidence of large
asymmetries in corporate interests) which can be achieved by delegating advice to imperfect
agents.
4.3.2 Evidence
The lobbyists are important for whom they know and have access to, and this makes them
earn a large premium. Estimating the value of lobbyist's political connections from stock
markets is one strategy. Gely and Zardkoohi (2001) study rms whom retain law rms as
lobbyists. The rms show abnormal gains when one of the partners at that rm obtains a
federal cabinet position. This eect disappears when anti-lobbying laws are enacted. Blanes-
i-Vidal et al. (2010) oer to date one of the empirically cleanest identication strategies to
measure the value of a political connection. For revolving-door lobbyists who were previously
congressional staers, they measure how exit of the former employer aects their payo. The
premium for connections is above 20%, and lasts for over three years.
Bertrand et al. (2011) compare the connection premium with the expertise premium using
price tags per report. The connection is proxied by individual campaign contributions of
the lobbyist to the PM. Expertise is measured by concentration of lobbyist's assignments
across 76 issues; another proxy is if a lobbyist spends at least 25% of his assignments in
each active year on the same issue. From price tags per report, the report-level analysis
reveals that (i) the premium of having a relevant specialist in the report is 3-5% and (ii) the
premium of having a relevant connected lobbyist is 8-10%. Extra evidence on time prole
of the lobbyists' assignment shows that lobbyists change topics as their connections switch
committee assignments. There are also revenue cycles independent on the time prole of
issues.
These report-level ndings can be combined with more aggregate ndings. For example,
in de Figueiredo and Cameron (2008), the size of the legislature does not matter for the
overall level of lobbying outlays. In Bertrand et al. (2011), lobbying works better if delivered
through a lobbyist with multiple connections and well-posited legislators. Thus, the number
of connected legislators makes a dierence. An explanation of both facts may lie in the orga-
nization of parties that distinguishes between marginal and inframarginal legislators. Extra
legislators that change the size of the legislature are marginal backbenchers, and these may
be irrelevant for lobbyists. Consequently, aggregate size does not matter, whereas lobbying
an individual inframarginal legislator matters.
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This review covers three main modeling traditions of lobbying, contest for policy rent, strate-
gic communication, and multiple-means models. In the rst part, it focuses on their devel-
opments in the last decade, and specically on the emergence of multiple means models that
involve search, persuasion, and contributions in a single game. The survey presents dier-
ent approaches to modeling aspects such as state spaces, preferences, lobbies' instruments,
policy-makers' and lobbies' commitments, bargaining, evidence veriability, message costs,
observability of search and the presence of the empty messages. In the second part, we look
into the recent theory and evidence on three selected issues: Incentive to lobby and the mag-
nitude of lobbying for a single lobby and multiple lobbies, the relationship between lobbying
and contributions (including bribes), and the role of lobbying intermediaries.
To summarize, the recent literature models policy makers as strategic players who benet
both from extra information and extra contributions provided by corporate interests. More-
over, strategic policy-makers who design access fees may improve their information and collect
campaign funds at the same time. By pitting one group against each other they extract huge
surplus, and if they encourage wide participation, they obtain large rents and more precise
information.
On the other hand, we show that competitive lobbying contest is often detrimental to
business interests. Lobbyists often gain low or even negative payos when lobbying instru-
ments are available and therefore benet from regulation of instruments. First and foremost,
competition in a lobbying contest dissipates much of the prize that caps on contributions
remedy. Secondly, the possibility of concealing evidence generates pessimistic policy-makers'
expectations that generate `an information trap' that forces lobbyists to make excessive eort.
Hence, imposing mandatory disclosure of search may be to the benet of lobbies.
The review also covers recent evidence on corporate lobbying, generated from cross-
country surveys and lobbying data disclosed in the U.S. since 1995. We observe a large
benet-cost ratio for those rms that lobby, even if not that striking as for campaign con-
tributions. The rms resort to intermediaries who dominate the market with inuence. The
distribution of returns of intermediaries is highly skewed. Only large and connected rms
tend to lobby; small rms rather bribe. In terms of instruments for inuence, with minor
exceptions, lobbying and corruption are substitutes rather than complements.
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